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Customizing Adversarial Machine Learning
to Test Deep Learning Techniques
Paul Temple, Gilles Perrouin, Benoît Frénay and Pierre-Yves Schobbens
NADI, PReCISE, Faculty of Computer Science
University of Namur, Belgium
Over the past decade, machine learning (ML) and deep
learning (DL) have achieved several breakthroughs, including
Google’s driverless cars, IBM Watson, deep learning for
playing Go, to name just a few. The apparition of ML-based
software in various systems also raises concerns on their
correct operation. Indeed, a non-perceivable modification
to an image can fool an ML algorithm to make incorrect
predictions, e.g. recognize a gibbon instead of a panda [1].
Recently, it has been reported that a change in the contrast
of the image of a road can lead a DL algorithm to turn right
instead of left [2]. These examples, whether they are natural
or deliberately engineered, are labeled as adversarial.
These cases have initiated a new trend in the ML
community. Adversarial Machine Learning (advML) strives
to understand, from security and safety points of view, how
ML processes can be biased by the underlying training
process or any further manipulations by potentially malicious
people. The field is very active and the body of knowledge is
growing [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Techniques usually focus on
fooling ML algorithms by creating small changes with major
impact on predictions. To do so, advML techniques usually
take the role of attackers trying to pass through the defense
that is represented by the ML decision system, trying to filter
incoming data. AdvML relies on the design of ML algorithms
and automatically targets specific aspects and weaknesses of
the algorithm in order to craft new data, so as to make the ML
decision system unusable as it will make too many mistakes
in its predictions. Adversarial attacks can be used at training
time or at exploitation time. Biggio et al. [7] have proposed
an history of advML techniques which shows how rich and
diverse these techniques can be. While first applications were
about intrusion detection systems and spams, the field has
quickly moved to handwritten digit recognition and are now
widely used in DL systems [8].
On the other hand, variability-intensive systems form
a vast and heterogeneous class of software systems that
encompasses: software product lines (SPLs), configurable
systems (operating systems kernels, web development
frameworks/stacks, e-commerce configurators, code
generators), Systems of Systems, software ecosystems
(e.g., Android’s “Play Store"), etc. All these systems
have the ability to be customized to specific needs (each
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customized system being called a variant) via the use of e.g.
configurators. Since DL systems have various parameters, they
can be seen as configurable as well: they can be configured
in their architecture (with varying number of layers or
number of neurons per layer), they can be convolutional or
recurrent, activation functions of neurons can be customized,
intermediate layers can be defined (using pooling or different
kernel sizes in the convolution), etc.
If DL based systems can be configured, so are advML
techniques. In this talk, we argue that to test DL systems
with such diversity, one should be able to configure advML
techniques so that they are the most efficient and appropriate
for the DL under test. Since each DL algorithm can be
confronted to various advML techniques, we might be able
to assess the sensitivity of specific DL algorithms to certain
advML attacks and thus provide guidelines in the choice
of the DL system to use in a certain context which favor
one or the other kind of attack. Our goal is to design a
framework in which we would be able to combine different
advML techniques, in which we can create new, more
powerful attacks that can test more efficiently ML and DL
algorithms. We think that the expertise developed in the
software variability research these last 15 years can be
employed to develop (auto)-configurable advML techniques.
We will illustrate a few scenarios and exhibit a research
agenda that involve both software variability and machine
learning communities to work together.
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